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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, : Case No. 950284-CA 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS : 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Priority No. 15 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 
78-2a-3(2) (k) , Utah Code Annotated (1995); however, no docketing 
statement as required by Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
has been filed in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The threshold question presented by this appeal is whether 
any issues have been properly preserved for appeal. Issues not 
raised below may not be raised for the first time on appeal, unless 
the trial court has committed plain and harmful error. James v. 
Preston. 746 P. 2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Cook. 881 P. 2d 
913 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. If this court considers appeal from default judgment which 
does not includes trial court's ruling on motion to set aside 
judgment under Rule 60(b), the appeal should be limited to the 
sufficiency of the claim upon which judgement is entered. This 
question is one of law which should reviewed for correctness. Ward 
v. Richfield CitV, 798 P. 2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
3. Whether the trial court acted unreasonably in its 
declination of further continuance in this matter. This decision 
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Christenson v. 
Jewkes. 761 P. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from entry of judgment by default from an 
action brought under authority of the Utah Controlled Substance Act 
for forfeiture of $16,000 in U.S. currency. 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below 
A complaint for forfeiture of property was filed in the 
Seventh Judicial District, Grand County on September 28, 1994 
alleging the property seized on February 24, 1994 was subject to 
forfeiture under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13. No responsive pleading 
was filed with the court and no formal appearance by any interested 
party was made. Following two continuances, the matter was heard 
on January 25, 1995. In support of its claim, plaintiff submitted 
testimonial evidence and judgment of forfeiture was entered on 
January 31, 1995. Appellant filed a notice of appeal simultaneous 
to a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. That 
motion was denied on April 5, 1995. 
C. Disposition of the trial court 
Upon its review of the record which showed no responsive 
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pleading on file, and following submission of evidence by the 
plaintiff in support of its claim, the trial court entered judgment 
of forfeiture on January 31, 1995. The trial court subsequently 
heard a motion for relief from judgment which it denied on April 5, 
1995. 
D. Statement of Facts 
Asset Forfeiture in Utah - There are several Utah 
statutory provisions which demarcate the process and procedure of 
asset forfeiture in Utah, including §58-37-13 of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act. In drug-related cases, asset forfeiture 
is a civil proceeding governed by specific procedural requirements 
within the statute. Following the seizure of property, a complaint 
is filed by the county attorney, which contains a description of 
the property, the date of seizure, and the basis for forfeiture. 
Notice of the action is served upon all known persons having an 
interest in the property by various means of notice described in 
the statute. Any claimant or interested party shall file a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days of service of 
notice. Thereafter, the trial court shall review the record. If 
an answer has been filed, the matter is set for hearing within 20 
days. If no answer is on file, the court allows the county 
attorney to proceed with evidence in support of the claim. 
Thereafter, the court determines if the property should be 
forfeited or returned and an order to that effect is entered. 
The Case at Bar - The property subject to this action was 
seized by Utah Highway Patrol following a traffic stop on February 
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24, 1994 in Grand County. On September 28, 1994, Grand County 
Attorney William L. Benge filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of 
the property under the provisions of the Utah Controlled Substance 
Act. R. 1-4. Notice of the complaint was served by mail on the 
known interested parties, and by publication in conformity with the 
statutory notice provisions. R. 5-6. No answer to the complaint 
was ever filed with the court. 
Prior to the January 25, 1995 hearing, the matter had been 
continued twice. According to the trial court's docket entries, 
the first continuance was upon state's written motion due to 
witness unavailability. R. 7-9. The second was made by the 
written motion on December 6, and an order was entered continuing 
the matter to January 25, 1995. R. 20-23. No claimant's response 
was ever filed with the court, nor was any appearance of counsel on 
behalf of any claimant filed. 
On the day of the hearing, the trial judge acknowledged 
receipt of a facsimile transmission which purported to be a motion 
for continuance. R. 61-62 (The record also contains an unnumbered 
series of documents which appear to be the faxed copy which shows 
transmission time and date of January 23, 1995 at 16:28 PST.) 
Because no one had appeared on behalf of the claimant and the 
purported motion did not conform with rules of civil procedure, 
upon oral motion of the county attorney the motion was stricken. 
R. 62. No other pleading appears in the record prior to entry of 
judgment. 
At the hearing, Trooper Darrel Mecam testified in support of 
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the claim and basis for seizure and forfeiture in this case. R. 
62-68. He testified that on February 24, 1994 he effected a 
traffic stop of a 1988 Hyundai for speeding. R. 63. A consent 
search of the vehicle revealed a secret bumper compartment 
containing a Browning .22 caliber rifle, a quantity of cash and 
marijuana residue. R. 65-66. The driver of the vehicle admitted 
ownership of the discovered items. The marijuana residue tested 
positive as marijuana. R. 67. At the close of the evidence the 
trial court found that the property was forfeitable as provided by 
law. R. 68. Judgment was entered by the court on January 31, 
1995. R. 28-29. 
Appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment with 
exhibits in support. R. 32-45. The trial court docket record 
shows this motion was denied on April 5, 1995. No appeal from that 
ruling has been taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant asks this court to review the factual basis for the 
judgment without first establishing his compliance with procedural 
requirements in preserving his appeal. In so doing, he seeks to 
avert this court's application of a more stringent standard of 
review so as to allow a second judicial analysis of the unrefuted 
facts in this case. Even upon such review, the claim is legally 
sufficient to sustain the judgment and this appeal is groundless. 
ARGUMENT 
It is axiomatic that finality of judgments and judicial 
economy are the cornerstones of justice, and while parties are 
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given access to a fair and impartial forum to resolves disputes, 
that access is not unlimited. Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P. 2d 315 
(Utah 1992) . It is likewise fundamental that no appeal may be 
taken from any judgment upon issues not properly preserved. James 
v. Preston, 746 P. 2d 799 (Utah App. 1987) . In this matter, 
Appellant seeks to circumvent the rules of civil and appellate 
procedure in order to re-try groundless issues before this court. 
POINT I 
Failure to appeal the denial of the motion to set aside 
judgement precludes inquiry into the basis for judgment. 
In Utah, appeal may be taken from a trial court's ruling on a 
motion for relief from judgment under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 60(b). [hereinafter 60(b) motion] Birch v. Birch, 
771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989) . Many of Utah's neighboring states 
also allow an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside 
default judgment. United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 
P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992); Dexter v. O'Neal, 649 P. 2d 680 (Wyo. 
1982); Apache East, Inc. v. Means, 601 P. 2d 615 (Ariz. App. 
1979); contra Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. 812 P.2d 350 (Nev. 
1991). 
A Utah trial court's ruling on a 60(b) motion will not be 
reversed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion. Miller v. 
Brocksmith, 825 P. 2d 690 (Utah App* 1992); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P. 
2d 92 (Utah 1986). In this instance, Appellant seeks review of the 
underlying facts and concomitant findings of the trial court 
without regard for its determination of the diligence or merits of 
his claim. In effect, he asks this court to ignore the trial 
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court's determination that there was no valid reason to set aside 
the judgment, without first establishing the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to do so. By his default Appellant has 
conceded the facts alleged; therefore, absent an appeal from the 
60 (b) motion, Appellant should not be entitled to a review of 
facts, and his appeal should be dismissed as to those issues. 
Likewise, no objection to the trial court's findings of fact was 
ever raised below, either post-judgment or in the motion for relief 
under Rule 60(b). 
While no Utah precedent has decided the precise issue of 
a factual appeal from default which did not include the 60(b) 
motion, some jurisdictions disfavor any direct appeal from default 
judgments. Dennison v. Doreen, 573 P.2d 1242 (Or L978); 
Industrial Commission v. Parise, 478 P. 2d 137 (Ariz. App. 1970), 
The rational behind such prohibition recognizes the balance which 
must be struck between fairness and finality. See Vonsmith v. 
Vonsmith, 666 S.W. 2d 424 (Mo. 1984). 
POINT II 
Direct appeal from default judgment is limited to whether 
the claim is sufficient to support the judgment. 
If Appellant's failure to appeal from the trial court's ruling 
on the 60(b) motion does not preclude consideration of his direct 
appeal, the scope of that review should be limited. Direct appeal 
from a default judgment may only reach the narrow question of 
whether the trial court erred as a matter of law granting judgment 
on the claim. Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P. 2d 757 (Utah 1990) 
By his non-appearance, Appellant acquiesced to the allegation of 
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the complaint and is limited to review of the legal sufficiency of 
the claim for relief sought by the pleading. This approach is 
likewise supported by other jurisdictions. Cockerham v. Zikratch. 
619 P. 2d 739 (Ariz. 1980); Raineesh Foundation International v. 
McGreer, 734 P. 2d 871 (Or. 1987), rev, on other grounds 737 P. 2d 
593(Or. 1987). In other words, appellate review should not go 
beyond the question of whether the complaint states a valid claim. 
In this case, Appellant has not raised nor contested the validity 
of the complaint. Failure to do so precludes further judicial 
scrutiny of the proceedings below, absent an adequate objection 
which preserves other issues for appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P. 
2d 799 (Utah App. 1987), accord State v. Cook, 881 P. 2d 913 (Utah 
App. 1994) . 
The State's position is further strengthened by the unique 
nature of forfeiture proceedings under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13. 
Subparagraph (9) (f) of that section allows for the submission of 
evidence in support of the claim, unlike ordinary default judgment 
entered upon the sufficiency of the pleading only. The trial court 
received evidence that the property subject to forfeiture, in this 
case $16,000 in currency, was found in close proximity to a 
substance which field tested positive a marijuana. This unrefuted 
evidence also becomes part of the claim, and is therefore 
impervious to challenge on appeal such as this. 
The only question remaining is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion based upon the totality of the claim that the 
property was subject to forfeiture under Utah law. In determining 
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the basis for forfeiture, the trial court was entitled to consider 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (g) (ii) which states: 
"there is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, 
and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances ... are forfeitable under this section; the 
burden of proof is upon the claimants of the property to 
rebut this presumption;11 
There is no question that marijuana is a forfeitable 
controlled substance, nor that the currency in this case was 
discovered in proximity to the marijuana. Therefore, even if it 
were properly argued in this fashion, this appeal must fail because 
the trial court did not err as a matter of law in determining the 
property was subject to forfeiture, based upon the complaint and 
the unrefuted evidence offered in support thereof. 
POINT III 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
the unfiled request of a non-party to delay the proceedings 
The Appellant baldly asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow continuance of the January 25 
hearing. On January 25, there was no response to the complaint in 
the court record, nor did anyone appear on behalf of the claimant. 
In point of fact, no proper motion to continue could be made absent 
a party at interest to make it. 
Appellant cites the standard of review for such question as 
"clearly erroneous" while relying on. authority which defines "abuse 
of discretion". The proper standard in reviewing a trial court's 
decision regarding continuance is an abuse of discretion standard. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 7o± *>. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988) . In any event, 
this argument fails for two reasons: (1) the issue is not 
properly preserved for appeal, and (2) regardless of the standard 
of review applied, the trial court acted properly in proceeding. 
Absent the appearance of a party to file a written or oral 
motion, and a subsequent ruling by the trial court, there is no 
issue upon which to appeal. Here there is no party, no motion, no 
ruling, and no objection for this court to consider. Secondly, the 
courts failure to acknowledge a faxed transmission which did not 
conform to Rule 10, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting 
continuance of an action to which no responsive pleading had been 
filed, by an attorney who had never filed an appearance in the 
case, hardly rises to the level of error regardless of the standard 
applied. It is obvious that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in proceeding with the hearing on January 25, 1995. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Appellant's requested relief 
from judgment in this case should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this z^7^ day of October, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
l$4=L ^
_^ 
W. REED 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing APPELLEE'S RESPONSE BRIEF were mailed this a-
October, 1995, postage prepaid, to: 
day of 
Michael H. Wray 
Paul G. Amann 
AMANN & WRAY 
_ 9 Exchange Place, #900 
( Salt Lake flitv, Ut^h^-&4ill 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Copies of determinative statutory provisions 
89 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-13 
owner, operator, or agent in charge of the con-
trolled premises consents in writing. i$S7 
6&37-11. District court jurisdiction to enjoin vi-
olations — Jury trial. 
(1) The district courts of this state shall have juris-
diction in proceedings in accordance with the rules of 
those courts to enjoin violations of this act. 
(2) If an alleged violation of an injunction or re-
straining order issued under this section occurs, the 
accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with 
the rules of the district courts. iS7i 
58-37-12. Enforcement — Coordination and co-
operation of federal and state agencies 
— Powers. 
The department and all law enforcement agencies 
charged with enforcing this act shall cooperate with 
federal and other state agencies in discharging their 
responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled sub-
stances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled 
substances. To this end, they are authorized to: 
(1) Arrange for the exchange of information 
between governmental officials concerning the 
use and abuse of dangerous substances. 
(2) Coordinate and cooperate in training pro-
grams in controlled substance law enforcement 
at the local and state levels. 
(3) Cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bu-
reau of Investigation by establishing a central-
ized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and col-
lect statistics, including records of drug-depen-
dent persons and other controlled substance law 
offenders within the state, and make the infor-
mation available for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement purposes. 
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at 
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant spe-
cies from which controlled substances may be ex-
tracted. 1S71 
68-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Sei-
zure —• Procedure. 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or ac-
quired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment 
of any kind used, or intended for use, in manufac-
turing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance in 
violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a 
container for property described in Subsections 
(lKa) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other 
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with 
health food supplements and herbs, used or in-
tended for use to administer controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter, 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels used or intended for use, to trans-
port, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in Subsections (lXa) 
and (1Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a 
common carrier in the transaction of busi-
ness as a common carrier may not be for-
feited under this section unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge of 
the conveyance was a consenting party or 
privy to violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited un-
der this section by reason of any act or omis-
sion committed or omitted without the 
owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(in) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject 
to a bona fide security interest is subject to 
the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or in-
tended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this chapter, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities 
used or intended to be used to facilitate any vio-
lation of this chapter, but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that 
all money, coins, and currency found in prox-
imity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing para-
phernalia, or to forfeitable records of the im-
portation, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable under 
this section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this pre-
sumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as de-
fined in Section 58-3 7b-1, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facil-
ities, or interest in real property of any kind 
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivat-
ing, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manu-
facturing any controlled substances in violation 
of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehous-
ing, or storage facility or interest in real 
property is subject to the bona fide security 
interest of a party who could not have known 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in pro-
ducing, cultivating, or manufacturing con-
trolled substances, a housing, warehousing, 
or storage facility or interest in real property 
may not be forfeited under this section un-
less cumulative sales of controlled sub-
stances on the property within a two-month 
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street 
value of any controlled substances found on 
the premises at any given time totals or ex-
ceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced 
in controlled substances law enforcement 
may testify to establish the street value of 
the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection; and 
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(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition car-
ried or used during or in relation to a violation of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, the Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or the Utah Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act or any firearm, 
weapon, or ammunition kept or located witfcin 
the proximity of controlled substances or other 
property subject to forfeiture under any of those 
acts. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this chap-
ter may be seized by any peace officer of this state 
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property. However, seizure without process 
may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection 
under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this chapter; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
Id) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used or intended 
to be used in violation of this chapter. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted 
promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforce-
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chap-
tec, the appropriate pereon OT agency may. 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are pos-
sessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distri-
bution in violation of this act are contraband *nd 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which 
are seized or come into the possession of the state are 
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the 
state if the owners are unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled sub-
stances in Schedules I and II are derived which have 
been planted or cultivated in violation of this chapter, 
or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or 
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily for-
feited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its 
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in 
control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an ap-
propriate license or proof that he is the holder of a 
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chap-
ter by a finding of the court that no person is entitled 
to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all 
property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint 
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing 
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding 
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited 
property in the enforcement of controlled sub-
stances laws, the court having jurisdiction over 
the case shall award the property to the seizing 
agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the pros-
ecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing 
and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property for-
feited under this section may not be applied by 
the court to costs or fines assessed against any 
defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no appli-
cation, any state agency, bureau, county, or mu-
nicipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfei-
ture shall be given the property for use in en-
forcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if 
within a prosecution district, the district attor-
ney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture and upon application for the property 
to the director of the Division of Finance. The 
application shall clearly set forth the need for the 
property and the use to which the property will 
be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance 
shall review all applications for property submit-
ted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing 
agency makes no application, make a determina-
tion based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated 
applicant or seizing agency, where no application 
is made, who may obtain the property upon pay-
ment of all costs to the appropriate department. 
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse 
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to 
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received 
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remain-
ing after payment shall be returned to the seiz-
ing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica-
tion under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of 
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the prop-
erty by public bidding or as considered appropri-
ate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be 
upon oath of two officers or employees of the de-
partment having charge of the property, and ver-
ified by the director of the department or his des-
ignated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a 
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be 
made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if 
within a prosecution district, the district attor-
ney where the property was seized or is to be 
seized. The complaint shall be filed in the circuit 
or district court if the property is not real prop-
erty and the value is less than $10,000. The com-
plaint shall be filed in the district court if the 
value of property other than real property is 
$10,000 or more or the property is real property. 
If the camplaisvt include* property \u&der the ju-
risdiction of the circuit court and also property 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district 
court, the complaint shall be filed in the district 
court The complaint shall describe with reason-
able particularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
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(iii) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure 
of the property which is the subject matter of the 
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, 
unless the property has previously been seized 
without a warrant under Subsection 58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture shall be filed with the county clerk, and 
served together with a copy of the complaint, 
upon all persons known to the county attorney or 
district attorney to have a claim in the property 
by one of the following methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last-known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is considered com-
plete even though the mail is refused or can-
not be forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claim-
ant or interested party shall file with the court a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interested person or claimant of the prop-
erty, prior to being served with a complaint un-
der this section, may file a petition in the court 
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in 
the property. The petition shall specify the claim-
ant's interest in the property and his right to 
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the 
county attorney or, if within a prosecution dis-
trict, the district attorney in the county of the 
seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20 
days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of 
forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a com-
plaint or petition for release, the court shall ex-
amine the record and if no answer is on file, the 
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner 
an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as the court determines. If the county 
attorney or district attorney has not filed an an-
swer to a petition for release and the court deter-
mines from the evidence that the petitioner is not 
entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter 
an order directing the county attorney or district 
attorney to answer the petition within ten days. 
If no answer is filed within that period, the court 
•hall order the release of the property to the peti-
tioner entitled to receive i t 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court 
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may 
present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfei-
ture. The court shall determine by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture or release of the property as it 
determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent 
of any other proceedings, whether civil or crimi-
nal, under this chapter or the laws of this state, 
(i) When the court determines that claimants 
have no right in the property in whole or in part, 
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and 
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Divi-
sion of Finance. The division shall dispose of the 
property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, 
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it 
•hall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it 
•hall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial 
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it 
•old and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legiti-
mate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the ac-
tion, including seizure, storage of the prop-
erty, legal costs of filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for 
the General Fund, 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where 
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the 
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, including seizure and storage of the 
property, against the individual or individuals 
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and 
may assess costs against any other claimant or 
claimants to the property as appropriate. 1993 
68-37-14. Resort for illegal use or possession of 
controlled substances deemed com-
mon nuisance — District court power 
to suppress and enjoin. 
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, 
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to 
which users or possessors of any controlled sub-
stances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or 
where use or possession of any substances violates 
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing, 
or selling any substances listed as controlled sub-
stances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a 
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or 
maintain any such place. 
(2) The district court has the power to make any 
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nui-
sance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing 
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continua-
tion of a nuisance. is?i 
68-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on vi-
olations — Enforcement officers ex-
empt from liability. 
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any 
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any 
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading 
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act, 
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception 
is upon the person claiming its benefit. 
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly 
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registra-
tion, order form, or prescription issued under this act, 
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license, 
registration, order form, or prescription, and the bur-
den of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption. 
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abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion. The op-
posing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 day6 after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, e t c On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
•aid action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judg-
ment In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a 
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). ~*; 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may ob-
tain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or 
after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
Addendum B 
Judgment of forfeiture 
WILLIAM L. BENGE, #0282 
Grand County Attorney 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: 801-259-1324 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
PILED J A N 3 1 1SS5 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
r v •%!••.« 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS, 
($16,000.00), 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, 
Defendant. 
No. 9407-059 
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE 
This matter having been submitted to the Court at a 
hearing on January 25, 1995, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, 
District Court Judge, and the Court having duly entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
currency, described in the Complaint on file herein, be, and is 
hereby adjudged forfeited to the State of Utah in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 58-37-13(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
1 
amended, and that the defendant currency be disposed of according 
to the provisions of said section. 
DATED this day of January, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ly^^R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
William L. Benge 
Grand County Attorney 
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